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1. Introduction1
In August 1979, when Paul Volcker became chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, the annual average inﬂation rate in the United States
was 9%. Inﬂation had risen by 3 percentage points over the prior eigh-
teen months and there were indications that it was poised to continue
to rise (as it did, rising to a peak of 11% in early 1980). The Fed had
pursued restrictive monetary policy to stabilize inﬂa t i o no nan u m b e r
of occasions in the prior two decades but, each time, inﬂation moved
higher shortly thereafter. Against the backdrop of a volatile interna-
tional and domestic situation in the early 1980s, the Fed brought the
inﬂation rate down to 4% by the end of 1983. During this period, the
U.S. experienced two recessions generally attributed to disinﬂationary
monetary policy, the 1981-82 recession exhibiting the largest cumula-
tive business cycle decline of employment and output in the post-World
War II period.
The “rise and fall” of inﬂation in the post-war period, and the Vol-
cker disinﬂation in particular, are central events that attracted many
economists to macroeconomics and have been the subject of a huge
body of research. We ﬁr s tm e tB e n n e t tM c C a l l u mi nt h el a t e1 9 7 0 s
and have discussed these events many times during a friendship of a
quarter century. In these conversations, Ben always stood for three
practices: a careful review of the macroeconomic facts, the elabora-
tion of small forward-looking linear macroeconomic models linking the
core variables in macroeconomics, and an appraisal of events in light
of these models. In this paper, we study the Volcker disinﬂation using
this approach.
We think of the disinﬂation as “incredible” in three senses. First,
looking backward, Volcker initiated a change in the average rate of
inﬂation that has been large and sustained, so that the inﬂation peak
in early 1980 stands out dramatically in the U.S. experience shown in
Figure 1. Second, relative to the perspectives of many contemporary
1The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System. The authors thank Carl
Christ, Motoo Haruta, Robert Hetzel, Andrew Levin, Allan Meltzer, Athanasios
Orphanides (our discussant), Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Bennett T. McCallum, Edward
Nelson, Robert Rasche and seminar participants at Johns Hopkins for comments
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observers in 1978, including ourselves, it is remarkable that a reduction
in inﬂation took place since inﬂa t i o ns e e m e dt ob eap e r m a n e n tf e a t u r e
of the U.S. economy at the time and the costs of reducing it seemed
so large. Third, we believe that “imperfect credibility of monetary
policy” was a core feature of the disinﬂation on several dimensions that
we highlight further below.
Prior to the disinﬂation, most economists thought that there would
be large and protracted output losses from reducing the long-term rate
of inﬂation in the United States. Notably, Okun [1978] surveyed six
macroeconomic Phillips curves with two common features: (i) “all...are
essentially accelerationist, implying virtually no long-run trade-oﬀ be-
tween inﬂation and unemployment,” and (ii) “all point to a very costly
short-run trade-oﬀ”. Speciﬁcally, Okun reported that the average esti-
mate of “the cost of a 1 point reduction in the basic inﬂation rate is
10 percent of a year’s GNP, with a range of 6 percent to 18 percent.”
Thus, if it had led to a downturn lasting four years, the 6 percent-
age point reduction in inﬂa t i o ne n g i n e e r e db yt h eV o l c k e rF e dw o u l d
have led to a modern Great Contraction, with output averaging 9 to
27 percent below capacity for a total loss of 36 to 108 percent.
In fact, the real consequences of the disinﬂation were sharply smaller
than Okun’s predictions. Figure 2 shows the decline in inﬂation and in
real activity during the Volcker disinﬂation, which involves a cumulative
output loss of about 20 percent according to traditional calculations.
While far less than predicted, the output losses were substantial by the
standards of post-war U.S. history and had great eﬀect on the lives
of many individuals during the period, as we recall from discussions
with friends, relatives, and neighbors. It is now fairly standard for
macroeconomists to suggest that the Volcker disinﬂation had a lower
than predicted real output cost precisely because of Volcker’s credibility.
By contrast, we think that the reduction in inﬂa t i o ne n g i n e e r e db y
the Fed under Volcker was accompanied by substantial output losses
precisely because it was viewed as not credible, in the sense that ﬁrms
and households believed for several years that the reduction in inﬂation
was temporary with a return to high inﬂation likely.
Imperfect credibility in a macroeconomic model: We build a very
simple macroeconomic model of the Volcker disinﬂation which attributes
all output costs to imperfect credibility. To match the actual declineThe Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 3
in inﬂation, which takes place from 1981 through 1983, our model
assumes that inﬂation declines gradually and cumulatively by 6 per-
centage points over ten quarters. The economic actors in the model
economy, however, think that there is a possibility that the disinﬂa-
tion program will be abandoned and that inﬂation will return to the
level prevailing at the start of the program. Speciﬁcally, we assume
that the probability of a successful disinﬂation is zero for the ﬁrst year
of the program and rises linearly thereafter. With these two elements
—ag r a d u a ld i s i n ﬂation and a gradual increase in the likelihood of a
permanent, major reduction in inﬂation — the model generates an out-
put decline which resembles the 1981-1983 experience in broad form:
a gradually intensifying decline in output, relative to capacity, which
reaches a trough after two years and then gradually recovers. The
imperfect credibility built into our model also implies very stubborn
inﬂationary expectations which are reﬂected in elevated long-term in-
terest rates.
Imperfect credibility within our interpretative history: Our histori-
cal analysis highlights two important indicators of imperfect credibility.
First, the behavior of intermediate and long-term interest rates is evi-
dence that the disinﬂation was incredible. For instance, while inﬂation
fell from over 10 percent in early 1981 to under 6 percent by mid-1982,
the 10-year bond rate actually increased from around 13% to over 14%
as shown in Figure 3. We interpret this evidence as indicating that
ﬁnancial markets expected high inﬂation to return. Second, the tran-
scripts of the Federal Open Market Committee indicate that Volcker
and other FOMC members thought that acquiring credibility for low
inﬂation was central to the success of their disinﬂation. Moreover, they
regarded long-term interest rates as indicators of inﬂation expectations
and of the credibility of their disinﬂationary policy. The FOMC viewed
the private sector as profoundly skeptical of its inﬂation-ﬁghting policy
actions and, as the recession deepened, they worried that the public
would expect a monetary policy “u-turn.” The FOMC recognized that
such skepticism was understandable given its own past behavior.
Our historical analysis also stresses that the Volcker disinﬂation did
not really start in earnest until late 1980 or early 1981. The policy
actions of the Volcker Fed in 1979 and 1980, including the celebrated
October 1979 announcement of new operating procedures with greaterThe Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 4
emphasis on money, merely contained inﬂation in the face of sharply
rising inﬂation expectations evident in bond rates in early 1980. The
Volcker Fed’s initial inﬂation-ﬁghting eﬀort was abandoned in mid-1980
with the onset of credit controls and a recession that we believe was
brought on in part by restrictive monetary policy. Like some members
of the FOMC at the time, we believe that this policy reversal likely hurt
the Fed’s credibility and thereby contributed to the ultimate costliness
of the disinﬂation of 1981-83. By November 1980, inﬂation was still run-
ning at an annual rate of over 10%. The Volcker Fed had behaved in
a manner consistent with prior experiences. It had undertaken restric-
tive monetary policy in the face of rising inﬂation, but it had promptly
reversed ﬁeld to ﬁght the recession and allowed inﬂation to continue to
rise.
In our view, the “deliberate disinﬂation” dates from late 1980 when
the federal funds rate rose to 19% as a result of restrictive monetary pol-
icy in conjunction with a strong recovery from the recession. This time,
t h em o v ea g a i n s ti n ﬂation was sustained. Rising inﬂation expectations—
again evident in bond rates in 1981—convinced the Fed to move deci-
sively to reduce inﬂation. Volcker and other FOMC members viewed
the restoration of Fed credibility for low inﬂation and the associated
real cost of a deliberate disinﬂation in 1981-82 as necessary to prevent
future recessions and inﬂation scares.
Much has been made of the Volcker disinﬂation as a grand “mone-
tarist experiment.” However, on its own initiative and under the prod-
ding of congressional committees, the Fed had begun to state money
growth targets in the early 1970s. These gradually assumed a more
prominent role in the FOMC and in popular policy discussions prior to
October 1979. Beginning in 1975, Fed presentations to congressional
committees included money target ranges; increasingly, at these hear-
ings and in other commentaries the Fed was criticized for missing its
monetary targets. The Fed continued to manage the federal funds rate
closely prior to October 1979. However, the narrow tolerance ranges
for the federal funds rate in FOMC policy directives did not prevent
the Fed from raising the funds rate aggressively on occasion, especially
in 1973 and 1978. The October 1979 change in operating procedures
placed more emphasis on targeting money, in part by allowing dramat-
ically wider federal funds rate tolerance ranges in FOMC directives.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 5
The FOMC transcripts indicate that the October 1979 shift in operat-
ing procedures was undertaken initially to improve the Fed’s inﬂation-
ﬁghting credibility in order to contain rising inﬂation expectations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we in-
troduce and describe our model of inﬂation and output dynamics. In
section 3, the main body of the paper, we undertake our interpreta-
tive history utilizing four types of information. First, we use macro-
economic data — as currently revised — to describe the broad history
of the economy immediately preceding and during the Volcker disin-
ﬂation. Second, we use the implications of our small macroeconomic
model. Third, we use FOMC transcripts, brieﬁngs of staﬀ economists
at FOMC meetings, and annual summaries of FOMC decisions pro-
duced by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Fourth,
we use information from the World Almanac,w h i c hr e ﬂects contempo-
rary perceptions of major events. In section 4 of the paper we consider
the interaction of monetary instruments, targets, and credibility with
the help of the transcripts and other contemporary sources. In a ﬁnal
section, we oﬀer brief concluding comments.
2. Deliberate disinﬂation with imperfect credibility
To develop the idea that the real eﬀects of the Volcker disinﬂation
were largely due to imperfect credibility, we use a very simple model,
which contains elements familiar from modern macroeconomics. How-
ever, our procedure is somewhat unorthodox: we abstain entirely from
discussion of the nature of the monetary policy process, simply assum-
ing that policy engineers a deliberate decline in the inﬂation rate. After
learning about the central features of a deliberate disinﬂation in this
section and then learning about the Volcker Fed’s view of the critical
role of imperfect credibility in section 3, we return to a more detailed
discussion of the monetary policy process in section 4 below. Since our
approach is somewhat unorthodox, we introduce the model elements in
“blocks” so that the reader can see how model ingredients ﬁt together
to produce our results.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 6
2.1. Disinﬂation, credibility, and real activity
To study the dynamic comovements of output and inﬂation, we
assume only that there is a New Keynesian pricing equation on the
part of ﬁrms and that there is a disinﬂa t i o np o l i c yo nt h ep a r to ft h e
central bank.
New Keynesian Pricing With price-setting by forward-looking
ﬁrms along the lines of Calvo [1983], there is a “New Keynesian pricing
equation” that links inﬂation πtand real output yt,
πt = Etπt+1 + h(yt − y
∗
t). (1)
In this expression, y∗
t is a measure of capacity output, so that yt−y∗
t is
a measure of the output gap, and Etπt+1 is the expected inﬂation rate.
The parameter h can be related to structural features of the economy
such as the frequency of price adjustment, the elasticity of marginal
cost with respect to output, and so forth.2 As has been much stressed
in the recent literature, the relevant measure of capacity output is the
level of output that would prevail if nominal prices were ﬂexible.3 That
is, capacity output corresponds to the level of output in a real business
cycle model that ﬂuctuates through time in response to macroeconomic
shocks to productivity, government expenditures, tax rates, and energy
prices, etc.
Holding expectations ﬁxed, the pricing equation implies that an
increase in real output brought about by a monetary expansion will
increase inﬂation, since capacity output is independent of monetary
policy. Most empirical macroeconomists think that the value of hin
this setting is fairly small, so that the output gap does not exert too
large an inﬂuence on inﬂation. There is no long-run trade-oﬀ in the
pricing equation since output is at capacity when current and expected
future inﬂation are equal.
Disinﬂation Policy Our assumption is that the disinﬂation takes
the following form, beginning from an initially high level of inﬂation
π. A tt h es t a r to ft h ed i s i n ﬂation at t=0, the central bank speciﬁes a
path for the inﬂation rate, which we call {e πt}T
t=1. The terminal value
at t = T of this inﬂation process is π. Each period, the public knows
2See Woodford [2003].
3See Goodfriend and King [1997] and Woodford [2003].The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 7
that the policy next period will continue with probability γt.I f i t d o e s
not continue, then inﬂation will go up to πand it will stay at that level
forever. That is, for simplicity, we assume that the only uncertainty
that agents have about inﬂation is whether the disinﬂation plan will
collapse. We assume that the e πpath is
e πt = π − μt for t=0,1,...T
e πt = π for t=T+1,T+2,...
with μ =( π − π)/T. We display a disinﬂation which reduces the
inﬂation rate from 10% to 4% over the course of 10 quarters in Figure
4. The disinﬂation is assumed to be imperfectly credible in that agents
do not believe that it will succeed at all for the ﬁrst year and then
gradually adjust their assessment upwards over the course of the next
three years.4 Hence, one-step-ahead expected inﬂation takes the form
Etπt+1 = γtEte πt+1 +( 1− γt)π
Given the pricing equation, output in a successful disinﬂation — one
that adheres to the path {e πt}T






[γt(e πt − Ete πt+1)] −
1
h
[(1 − γt)(π − e πt)]
The ﬁrst term in this expression is the positive expected disinﬂation
eﬀect stressed by Ball [1994]. The second term in this expression is the
negative imperfect credibility eﬀect introduced by Ball [1995] that we
stress in this analysis.
Under these assumptions, the path of output gaps in a successful















[(1 − γt)(π − π)] for t ≥ T
4Baxter [1985] provides an early analysis of the dynamics of expectations during
stabilization policy, applying Bayesian learning to inﬂation. It would be desirable
to explore the Volcker disinﬂation in such a framework.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 8
By contrast, the output gap is zero if the plan collapses and remains
there, since inﬂation is forever at π.
At this point, we assume that there are no important variations
in capacity output, so we can talk interchangeably about ﬂuctuations
in the output gap or in output itself.5 The path of output depends
on two features of the model. First, for ﬁxed probabilities of success
(γt = γ), output depends positively on the expected disinﬂation under
the e π path. Second, for ﬁxed probabilities of success (γt = γ), output
depends negatively on how long the disinﬂation plan has been in place
because this indexes the size of inﬂation surge which will occur if there
is a failure. Third, the recession can last longer than the disinﬂation, if
there is a lingering probability of failure. Fourth, if the plan becomes
more credible as it ages (γt increases through time), then the smaller
failure probability induces a partial recovery, even though continuing
disinﬂation induces a deepening recession. For these reasons, it is rel-
atively easy for this sort of model to produce a triangular-shaped path
of output over the course of the disinﬂation process.
The top panel of Figure 5 displays the behavior of real output
(yt − y∗
t) under our assumptions about the course of the disinﬂation
and the evolution of beliefs pictured in Figure 4. Output reaches a
trough two years after the initiation of the policy, somewhat before
the disinﬂation is complete. Output continues below capacity and the
output gap closes slowly after the disinﬂation is concluded because of
the continuing imperfect credibility of the disinﬂation program. The
middle panel of Figure 5 shows another key aspect of the disinﬂation:
given that individuals attach a high likelihood to the collapse of the
disinﬂation plan for most of the period, they also entertain a signiﬁ-
cant possibility that output will return promptly to capacity, so that
there is a high expected growth rate of output. Put another way, for
most of the disinﬂation, individuals expect the decline in inﬂation and
output to be temporary.
5This assumption facilitates comparison of our model outcomes with the tradi-
tional measure of the output gap during the Volcker disinﬂation shown in Figure
2. However, we recognize that events during the period, which included important
changes in ﬁscal policy, time-variation in productivity, and changes in energy prices
likely induced signiﬁcant variation in capacity output.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 9
2.2. Beliefs and interest rates
Since our analysis assigns substantial importance to the evolution
of beliefs, it is useful to spell out additional elements of the model in
which beliefs play a role.
The Fisher Equation The link between the nominal interest rate,
the ex ante real interest rate, and expected inﬂation is given by the
Fisher equation
Rt = rt + Etπt+1. (2)
The Real Interest Rate and Expected Consumption Growth
Most macroeconomic models now embody a form of the permanent in-
come hypothesis, which has two components. First, as stressed by
Friedman [1957] the present value of consumption is constrained by the
present value of income. Second, as stressed by Fisher [1930] there
is a positive relationship between the real interest rate and expected
consumption growth.
As in many other recent macroeconomic analysis, we assume that
a l lo u t p u ti sc o n s u m e ds ot h a tt h ee xa n t er e a lr a t eo fi n t e r e s ti no u r
model evolves according to
rt = σ(Etyt+1 − yt)+r (3)
but we also discuss the behavior of consumption and investment under
more realistic assumptions below.
The “natural rate of interest” r∗
t is the ex ante real rate when actual









More generally, it would be the interest rate consistent with “the real
business cycle core” of the relevant macroeconomic model.
The Term Structure of Interest Rates Real and nominal re-
turns on a long-term discount bond (one with L periods to maturity)
are based on the expectations theory of the term structure of interest






Etrt+j +( rL − r)=σ
1
L
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It is important to stress that longer-term yields reﬂect permanent vari-
ations, since these dominate an expected future average. Accordingly,
we will frequently employ the idea that variations in long-term nominal
yields are dominated by “expected inﬂation trends.”
Expected Inﬂation at Various Horizons The bottom panel of
Figure 5 shows the response of expected inﬂation at two horizons under
our assumptions. At each date in the ﬁgure, we show the expected rate
of inﬂation one-quarter ahead and we also calculate the expected ten-
year average inﬂation rate. Our assumptions about beliefs imply that
it takes some time for the one-quarter-ahead expected inﬂation rate to
depart from π = .10 and also that the expected future ten-year average
inﬂa t i o nr a t ei sm u c hm o r es t u b b o r n l ye l e v a t e d .
Ex Ante Real Interest Rates Ex ante real interest rates (partic-
ularly short-term rates) are high during a deliberate but incredible dis-
inﬂation because output is temporarily depressed and the public would
otherwise like to borrow against brighter future income prospects to
smooth current consumption. Expected output growth, and therefore
the ex ante real rate, can be especially high because of the possibility
that the disinﬂation might fail and output might snap back to capacity
at any time. The middle panel of Figure 5 displays one-quarter-ahead
expected output growth at each date, and thereby provides a picture
of the path of annualized ex ante real interest rates during the disin-
ﬂation once an assumption about σ is made. The ﬁgure illustrates an
important point: ex ante real interest rates must rise as the recession
deepens over the course of an incredible disinﬂation.
In our model, the size of the ex ante real interest rate response
to the attempt at consumption-smoothing is implausibly large. In a
model with a richer real business cycle core, consumption would be
smoothed, ex ante real interest rates would increase less, and investment
in business and consumer durables would decline substantially as during
the actual recession accompanying the Volcker disinﬂation (see Figure
2). For instance, Erceg and Levin [2003] study the dynamics of an
imperfectly credible disinﬂation in a sticky price model with investment.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 11
Their more extensive and realistic model exhibits a large decline in
investment and a relatively small increase in the ex ante real rate, as
agents smooth consumption in the face of an output loss which they
presume to be quite transitory.
To sum up, the broad features of a deliberate disinﬂation with im-
perfect credibility revealed by our analysis are these: (i) there can be a
severe recession if the policy is successful when private agents believe it
will not succeed; (ii) the recession can last longer than the disinﬂation
if the credibility of disinﬂation evolves more slowly than the reality;
(iii) real rates will be particularly high in the midst of the recession;
a n d( i v )e x p e c t e di n ﬂation will be stubbornly elevated, particularly at
long horizons.
3. Imperfect credibility and the Volcker disinﬂation
With an understanding of how imperfect credibility governs the dy-
namics of real output in a deliberate disinﬂation, we turn now to our
study of the actual Volcker disinﬂation, drawing on our model and the
perspectives of members of the FOMC and other contemporary ob-
servers to describe and interpret the major features of this remarkable
period in U.S. monetary history.
3.1. The inﬂation background
Figure 1 displays the course of inﬂation from 1967 through 1987
and highlights prominent episodes and events that we refer to in our
discussion. We identify the “Volcker era” at the Fed with the dark
portion of the horizontal axis from mid-1979 through mid-1987. Second,
we shade the four NBER recessions that occurred during the period.
Third, we identify with a diamond ‘♦’ the four dates at which Romer
and Romer [1989] suggest that anti-inﬂationary monetary policy actions
were initiated. Fourth, we include the four “inﬂation scare” episodes
identiﬁed by Goodfriend [1993] via the narrow rectangular boxes.
3.1.1. Inﬂation 1967-1976
In 1967, inﬂation was running at about a 21
2 % annual rate, but it
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to ﬁght inﬂation on two occasions in this period, in December 1968
and April 1974, after sharp increases in inﬂation. In the ﬁrst episode,
the Fed moved the federal funds rate up by 3 percentage points to
around 9% from December 1968 to mid-1969 and held it there until a
recession began in late 1969. Inﬂa t i o np e a k e di n1 9 7 0a ta r o u n d5 %
and fell temporarily until 1973. In the second episode, the Fed moved
the federal funds rate up aggressively from around 5% beginning in
early 1973 and held it in the 10% to 12% range through the recession
in 1974. Inﬂation increased dramatically in the wake of the energy crisis
beginning in the fall of 1973, but temporarily slowed to around 5% in
1976.
The behavior of the 10-year bond rate, shown in Figure 3, mirrors
the lower frequency changes in inﬂation during this period. In early
1967 the 10-year bond rate was just under 5%. It rose to about 8% in
early 1970, but fell back to the 6% range in 1971, suggesting that the
Fed’s inﬂation-ﬁghting actions in 1969-70 allowed only a 1 percentage
point increase in long-term expected inﬂation. With the dramatic rise
in inﬂation in the wake of the energy crisis of 1973, the 10-year rate
then rose steadily from 6% to 8% in 1973-4, straight through the Fed’s
inﬂation-ﬁghting actions, and fell back only a little as actual inﬂation
retreated temporarily to 5% in 1976. Overall, the 3 percentage point
increase in the 10-year bond rate from 1967 to 1976 suggests a similar
increase in trend inﬂation expectations and a growing skepticism of the
permanence of the Fed’s inﬂation-ﬁghting actions.
3.1.2. Rising Concerns: January 1977-July 1979
In November 1976 congressional testimony, Arthur Burns, chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board, warned that there might be inﬂationary
consequences of attempts to stimulate the economy through tax cuts,
increased government spending, or looser money policy.6 President-
elect Jimmy Carter said he would consider such steps if economic ac-
tivity continued to be slow. Terming such steps “unnecessary as well
as dangerous”, Burns said “it seems entirely reasonable to expect a
pickup in the tempo of economic activity in the near future” without
any special government action. After a weekend ﬂurry over Burns’s
6See Hetzel [1998].The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 13
testimony, Carter announced that he had received a pledge of support
from Burns and that he believed they would “ﬁnd a substantial degree
of compatibility.”7 However, in a surprise move in late December 1977
Carter announced the replacement of Burns with G. William Miller.8
The Carter administration regarded the use of monetary policy to
contain inﬂation as excessively costly in terms of output and unem-
ployment, so that it built its series of anti-inﬂation programs around
ﬁscal and regulatory methods. Nevertheless, Carter’s programs met
with continuing criticism from business and labor leaders; he also faced
criticism within his party on unemployment. October 1978 saw the
enactment of the Humphey-Hawkins Full Employment Law, which set
a national goal for reducing unemployment from the 1978 level of 6%
to 4% by 1983. The law also called for inﬂation to be reduced to 3%
by 1983 and to zero by 1988, but speciﬁed that this was not impede
the reduction in unemployment. However, the legislation authorized
no programs, leaving it to the President and Congress to determine the
means to achieve its goals.
Beginning in August 1978, the Miller Fed engineered a sharp rise in
the funds rate to ﬁght inﬂation (yielding the Romer date in Figures 1
and 3) which was followed by a highly publicized intervention to support
the declining foreign exchange value of the dollar in November. Despite
these actions, inﬂation and the long-term bond rate continued to rise
through the middle of 1979, and the dollar continued to depreciate.
Late 1978 and early 1979 also witnessed turmoil in Iran, with the return
of Ayatollah Khomenei from exile, major increases in oil prices by some
exporting nations, and shortage warnings from Energy Secretary James
Schlesinger, who described the loss of Iran’s oil supply as prospectively
more serious than the oil embargo of 1973-5.
By April 1979 Volcker, then president of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, was suﬃciently at odds with the policy actions taken by
the FOMC that Chairman Miller noted “Paul, you’re just a constant
no.” (FOMC transcript, 4-17-1979, p. 35) In view of later events, Vol-
cker’s comments are revealing. First, in continuing committee debates
7Quotations and contemporaneous observations are from the World Almanac.
8 Burns’s term as chairman was to expire at the end of January 1978; but his
term as governor did not expire until 1984 and there was an expectation that he
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over the relative role of monetary aggregates and interest rates in the
directive, Volcker argued that “the only reasonable conclusion is not
to put much weight on the aggregates.” (FOMC transcript,4 - 1 7 - 7 9 ,
p. 15). Second, Volcker questioned forecasts for real output and inﬂa-
tion, stressing that inﬂation was an important problem that required a
commitment of policy to long-run objectives
[Inﬂation] clearly remains our problem. In any longer-range
or indeed shorter-range perspective, the inﬂationary mo-
mentum has been increasing. In terms of economic stability
in the future that is what is likely to give us the most prob-
lems and create the biggest recession. And the diﬃculty in
getting out of a recession, if we succeed, is that it conveys
an impression that we are not dealing with inﬂation...We
talk about gradually decelerating the rate of inﬂation over
a series of years. In fact, it has been accelerating over a
series of years and hasn’t yet shown any signs of reversing.
(FOMC transcript, 4-17-79, p. 16)
Third, Volcker was skeptical about the conventional view that policy
was tight and inappropriately so in the spring of 1979.
3.2. Containing Inﬂation: August 1979-October 1980
B yt h et i m et h a tP a u lV o l c k e rb e c a m eF e dc h a i r m a ni nA u g u s t1 9 7 9
inﬂation was rising rapidly. Despite the high inﬂation-ﬁghting proﬁle
adopted by the Fed with its dramatic October 1979 announcement of
new operating procedures to improve monetary control, the 15 month
period through October 1980 was one in which inﬂation was barely
contained and inﬂation expectations continued to rise. The aggres-
sive actions undertaken by the Fed succeeded in restraining inﬂation
temporarily, but they did so in the face of a mild recession and the
diﬃcult-to-interpret macroeconomic consequences of the credit controls
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3.2.1. Initial statements and actions
Conﬁrmed on July 30th and sworn in on August 6th, Volcker faced
immediate challenges. The Almanac documents that the Labor Depart-
ment reported a 1.1% increase in producer ﬁnished goods prices in July
and that the Joint Economic Committee of Congress warned that “the
average American was likely to see his standard of living dramatically
reduced in the 1980s unless productivity growth was accelerated.”
In laying out his overall monetary policy philosophy and arguing
strongly for a rate increase at the August FOMC meeting, Volcker
began by noting that
When I look at the past year or two I am impressed myself
by an intangible: the degree to which inﬂationary psychol-
ogy has really changed...I think that people are acting on
that expectation [of continued high inﬂation] much more
ﬁrmly than they used to...[and] it does produce, potentially
and actually, paradoxical reactions to policy...I think we are
in something of a box—a box that says that the ordinary re-
sponse one expects to easing actions may not work...They
won’t work if they’re interpreted as inﬂationary; and much
of the stimulus will come out in prices rather than activity.
(FOMC transcript, 8-14-79, p. 21)
Volcker went on to say that “it would be nice if...we could restore
[the credibility] of economic policy in general on the inﬂation issue,”
adding later that we “don’t have a lot of room for maneuver and I
don’t think we want to use up all our ammunition now in a really
dramatic action...[which] would not be understood without more of a
crisis atmosphere than there is at the moment.” Lindsay, Orphanides,
and Rasche [2005], page 194, provide longer versions of these latter
quotations and highlight their importance for understanding the new
chairman’s thinking.
3.2.2. October-November 1979
The Almanac reports that the dramatic October 6, 1979 adoption
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widespread speculative price increases in commodity markets. Lindsay,
Orphanides, and Rasche [2005, pp. 196-8] emphasize that there had
been a highly publicized for 4-3 split decision on a September 1979
discount rate increase, suggesting that commodity price increases arose
from speculator beliefs that a divided FOMC would be unable to control
rising inﬂation. It was in this crisis atmosphere that the Volcker Fed
began its aggressive inﬂation-ﬁghting actions. The result was a swift
and substantial rise in the federal funds rate.
We discuss the change in operating procedures further in Section 4
below. At this point, though, we stress that a remarkable feature of the
October and November FOMC meetings is the extent to which mem-
bers discuss market psychology in general and inﬂation expectations
in particular. The November 1979 meeting was lengthy and detailed,
focusing initially on the magnitude and consequences of oil price in-
creases and then on the mechanics of the new operating procedures.
FOMC members afterwards conducted a wide-ranging discussion that
was quite revealing about their evolving perspective. A substantial
portion of the discussion centered on the Fed’s objectives, the issue of
policy credibility and the behavior of the long rate. The rise in interest
rates stemming from the October 6 actions had been a major topic of
discussion as Volcker had traveled around the county over the interven-
ing month. He noted “the ﬁr s tq u e s t i o nIg e ti s“ a r ey o ug o i n gt os t i c k
with it?” (FOMC transcripts, 11-20-79, pp. 23)
John Balles, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
provides a compact statement containing many of the key themes of the
November 1979 meeting and the times,
[The] real purpose of our October 6 actions was to get in-
ﬂation under control by bringing about a deceleration of
money (growth)...So I think that we’re right in the midst
of a great credibility test and I wouldn’t want to rock the
boat...I think that our credibility and hence our impact on
long-term rates will be messed up if we don’t meet those
goals that we’ve announced. (FOMC transcripts, 11-20-79,
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While other participants expressed similar surprise about the be-
havior of long-term interest rates, a harder line was taken by Robert
Mayo, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, “there has
been, even among sophisticates an almost complete...disillusionment as
to whether inﬂation can be controlled. This is reﬂe c t e di nl o n g - t e r m
rates and makes our job even more of a challenge.” (FOMC transcripts,
11-20-79, p. 30)
These quotations illustrate, we think, one of the major revelations
from the FOMC transcripts: under Volcker, the FOMC recognized that
inﬂationary expectations were imbedded in long-term interest rates;
that volatile expectations about future inﬂation made long rates highly
sensitive to macroeconomic events including policy actions; that im-
perfect credibility about future monetary policy made long-term rates
stubborn in the face of policy actions; and that the management of in-
ﬂation expectations was a crucial, but very diﬃcult, part of the FOMC’s
job. This is a remarkably modern set of viewpoints, which many con-
temporary observers of the FOMC, ourselves included, did not suspect
at the time. Such understanding, however, did not make the job of tam-
ing inﬂation any easier or that of consistently pursuing anti-inﬂation
policy in the face of a weakening real economy less diﬃcult for members
of the FOMC, or less costly for the economy.
3.2.3. The ﬁrst inﬂation scare: December 1979-February 1980
The Fed paused in its tightening at the end of year with the federal
funds rate around 131
2% and the 10-year rate at 101
2%a ty e a r ’ se n d .
The 10-year rate then rocketed to nearly 12% by the February 4-5,
1980 FOMC meeting, even as the funds rate fell below 13%. Good-
friend [1993] identiﬁes this as an “inﬂation scare” and many members
of the FOMC similarly interpreted it, although with diﬀering degrees
of emphasis.9
9In his brieﬁng at the February 4-5 FOMC meeting Peter Sternlight, Manager
for Domestic Operations, System Open Market Account, reported that long rates
rose by around 1 percentage point in the intermeeting period even as the funds
rate fell slightly “reﬂecting...a weakening conﬁdence that the long-term inﬂation
problem can be handled successfully.” He added that “there is also a feeling that
the System has relaxed its ﬁrm resolve of last October to excercise restraint...the
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That the U.S. might have entered a new permanent situation is
well-illustrated by the comments of Governor Wallich,
So we have to consider now that we are in a group of high in-
ﬂation countries with Italy and the United Kingdom...We’ve
moved very far. (FOMC transcripts, 2-5-80, p. 41)
At the same time, the Fed sensed a turning point in economic activ-
ity, with economist Joseph Ziesel noting that “fundamental forces are
moving us into recession”10 Hence, the FOMC was confronted with a
dilemma: rising inﬂation, deteriorating credibility, and weakening real
activity.
The inﬂation scare deepened over the course of the ensuing month.
In the week prior to the March 18, 1980 FOMC meeting the 10-year
rate stood at over 121
2%, having increased by 80 basis points since the
prior meeting (and having exceeded 13% a few weeks before). The
funds rate had increased as well with an initial rise of about 100 basis
points — surrounding a February 15th increase in the discount rate in
t h ef a c eo fw o r s e n i n gi n ﬂation news — and then a large jump of 150
basis points to 16 1
4%, as the FOMC held an emergency telephone call
on March 5th to consider how to reign in growth in broad monetary
aggregates, while seeing narrow aggregates decline.
The outcome of the March 18, FOMC meeting included a “dis-
count rate surcharge of 3 percentage points” on transactions with large
banks.11 Within two weeks the funds rate was at 19%. In the wake of
these interest rate changes, commodity speculation cooled. The Hunt
brothers’ silver empire collapsed in the face of large price declines. Al-
together, during the December 1979-February 1980 inﬂation scare, the
Federal Reserve took actions that raised interest rates substantially,
from 131
2% to around 19%. Ultimately, however, these aggressive inter-
est rate policy actions would only serve to contain inﬂation temporarily,
not reduce it; in part because they helped to precipitate a recession to
w h i c ht h eF e df e l tc o m p e l l e dt or e s p o n d .
about prospects for dealing successfully with inﬂation.” (pp. 3-4)
10FOMC transcripts,Z i e s e lF O M Cb r i e ﬁng, 2-5-80, p. 1.
11Cook [1989] describes and evaluates the role of discount rate policy actions in
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3.2.4. The recession of 1980
The Fed faced substantial pressures as the recession, which the
NBER dates from January 1980, intensiﬁed. Credit controls were in-
troduced by the Carter administration in March 1980 and the admin-
istration acknowledged the ongoing recession in April.
Declining real activity concerned FOMC members at their March
18 meeting. The tensions were well illustrated by the remarks of Gov-
ernor Partee, who had carefully reviewed the eﬀects that the Carter
credit controls and other ﬁnancial market developments were having
on spending. He closed by warning,
That brings me to one more point, which is that I would
hate to have somebody ask me what I was doing during the
crash and have to remark that I was defending our credibil-
ity. The people who say let’s keep those interest rates up
there, regardless of what happens, are really walking into
a major trap for the economy and for the Federal Reserve.
(FOMC transcripts 3-18-80, p. 34)
But Volcker’s counterargument held for the time, with the chairman
doubting the weakness in the economy, and painting a picture that left
the Fed little room for maneuver,
What stands out to me is that we haven’t any room to grow
here, given the declines in productivity and other pressures
on the economy. And if we tried to stimulate growth very
much, we really would have no chance of dealing with the
inﬂationary psychology; we’d in fact face a blow-oﬀ on the
inﬂation side if we don’t already have a blow-oﬀ.( F O M C
transcripts 3-18-80, p. 35)
Responding to concerns about the eﬀects of high interest rates and
credit controls on ﬁnancial institutions, Volcker argued that “the worst
thing that can happen to them is [for us to] fail to do the job and get
the interest rate turn fairly soon.” (FOMC transcripts 3-18-80, p. 36)The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 20
3.2.5. Credit controls and policy easing
I naw i d e l y - w a t c h e ds p e e c hf r o mt h eW h i t eH o u s eo nM a r c h1 4 ,
1980 President Carter announced the imposition of “credit controls” as
the centerpiece of the fourth anti-inﬂation program of his presidency:
“Just as our governments have been borrowing to make ends meet,” he
said, “so have individual Americans. But when we try to beat inﬂation
with borrowed money, we just make problems worse.” Carter went on
to say “Inﬂation is fed by credit-ﬁnanced spending. Consumers have
gone into debt too heavily. The savings rate in our nation is now
the lowest in more than 25 years...” Carter justiﬁed the credit control
program saying: “The traditional tools used by the Federal Reserve
to control money and credit expansion are a basic part of the ﬁght on
inﬂation. But in present circumstances, those tools need to be rein-
forced so that eﬀective restraint can be achieved in ways that spread
the burden reasonably and fairly.” Carter authorized the “Federal Re-
serve to impose new restraints on the growth of credit on a limited and
carefully targeted basis.” The credit controls were complex, consisting
of voluntary lending guidelines for banks, special reserve requirements
for selected consumer credits, managed liabilities, and money market
funds, and a surcharge on Fed discount window borrowings for large
banks.12
Schreft [1990, p. 41] documents that: “The consumer credit con-
trols were largely symbolic and without teeth; however, they induced
consumers to alter their buying behavior. Consumer spending, espe-
cially credit-ﬁnanced expenditures, fell oﬀ dramatically.” Data released
July 9 showed that consumer installment credit fell a record 13 percent
in May. New consumer credit extensions were 25 percent lower than
the September 1979 peak. These declines were attributed to the eﬀect
of the controls on consumers. Led by a collapse of consumer spending,
the economy was so weak in June that the credit control program was
phased out in early July.
3.2.6. Inﬂation containment in historical perspective
The August 1979-October 1980 period saw a rise in actual inﬂation
and in long-term inﬂation expectations, which led to a series of Fed-
12The description of the credit control program is taken from Schreft [1990].The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 21
eral Reserve actions to contain inﬂation. These actions included the
introduction of new operating procedures and an aggressive increase in
short-term interest rates to unprecedented levels in the spring of 1980.
In response to the sharp decline in economic activity associated with
credit controls, the Fed began to ease policy in April. It took the fed-
eral funds rate down to 9% by July 1980 (the NBER recession trough),
when it began to tighten policy again as the economy recovered from
recession.
The net eﬀect is best summarized as follows: In November 1979,
the funds rate averaged 13 1
4% and the 10-year rate was around 101
2%.
In October 1980, the funds rate and the 10-year rate were roughly
where they had been in November of the preceding year. After all the
turbulence, inﬂation had barely been contained in the 10 to 11% range.
As emphasized previously by Shapiro [1994], there is a recurrent pat-
tern evident in Figure 1. The Fed moved the federal funds rate sharply
higher at Romer dates in response to rising inﬂation. But within two
or three years, inﬂation was no lower. In retrospect, we can see that
these inﬂation-ﬁghting episodes merely contained inﬂation temporarily.
Thus, it is reasonable to think that contemporaneous observers saw the
Fed’s inﬂation-ﬁghting actions from August 1979 through October 1980
as another example of a familiar pattern: rising inﬂation followed by
temporarily restrictive monetary policy actions, a recession, and a sub-
sequent policy reversal which results in little if any progress against
inﬂation. In this sense, the dramatic high-proﬁle policy actions of the
ﬁrst year of the Volcker era at the Fed looked not too diﬀerent from
previous inﬂation-ﬁghting episodes.
3.3. Deliberate disinﬂation: November 1980-June 1982
The true onset of the Volcker disinﬂation dates to November 1980
or early 1981. In November, Reagan beat Carter in a landslide and
brought about a new course in U.S. economic policy. Among other
things, the Reagan administration voiced strong support for Fed mone-
tary policy to reduce inﬂation.13 Moreover, in November long-running
13See, for instance, A Program for Economic Recovery, February 18, 1981, the
brieﬁng book prepared by the incoming Reagan administration outlining its eco-
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skirmishes between Iran and Iraq erupted into full-scale war, increasing
concerns about rising energy prices. The Almanac reports a December
1980 jump in CPI inﬂation to a 12% annual rate of increase.
Restrictive monetary policy in conjunction with the robust recovery
from the 1980 recession took the federal funds rate from 9% in July of
1980 to nearly 19% in December, with 6 percentage points of that
increase coming in November and December alone. The 1-year T-bill
rate increased from about 8% in July 1980 to over 14% by year-end
as well. The funds rate stayed at 19% through July of 1981, although
it dipped due to technical factors associated the Fed’s new reserve-
targeting procedures and the introduction of nationwide NOW accounts
in the spring.14 Financial markets were aware of the temporary nature
of the dip, and the 1-year T-bill rate fell slightly at ﬁrst and then rose
further to exceed 16% by July 1981.
The FOMC understood that its tight policy risked a renewed re-
cession, but Volcker argued that holding the line on inﬂation was war-
ranted. At the February 1981 FOMC meeting Volcker described the
FOMC as “presented with a gloomy economic forecast by some stan-
dards,” elaborating that the forecast did not include a recession but
that one could not “discount having something that would be called a
real recession.” But he nevertheless noted,
There is a general question, which I guess is the most impor-
tant question, of how serious we are in dealing with inﬂa-
tion. I got a little feeling, as I listened to the conversation,
that we’re like everybody else in the world on that: Every-
body likes to get rid of inﬂation but when one comes up to
actions that might actually do something about inﬂation,
implicitly or explicitly, one says: “Well, inﬂation isn’t that
bad compared to the alternatives.” We see the risks of the
alternative of a sour economy and an outright recession this
year. So, maybe there’s a little tendency to shrink back on
what we want to do on the inﬂation side. I don’t want to
Fed’s eﬀort to slow the growth of money in order to return the economy to price
stability.
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shrink back very far; that is my general bias for all the rea-
sons we have stated in our rhetoric but don’t always carry
through on. (FOMC transcripts 2-2/3-81, p. 129)
3.3.1. The second inﬂation scare: January-October 1981
With the federal funds rate at 19% in 1981, the FOMC must have
been shocked to encounter a period of rising long-term interest rates
paralleling the increase that it had experienced in early 1980. By late
1980, the 10-year bond rate had reversed the 2 percentage point decline
associated with the 1980 recession and was back above 12%. It contin-
ued climbing steadily to a peak in excess of 15% in October 1981. The 3
percentage point gain from January to October 1981 reﬂected a second
inﬂation scare even greater than the ﬁrst in 1980. The second inﬂa-
tion scare was particularly disturbing to the Fed because it occurred
in spite of an even more determined tightening of interest rate policy
than occurred in late 1979. Long-term inﬂation expectations appeared
to many observers to be moving up, rather than declining in the face of
a restrictive monetary policy. The 3 percentage point rise in long-term
interest rates in 1981 encouraged the Fed to persist with its 19 percent
federal funds rate.
In our view, this was a pivotal moment in U.S. monetary history,
w h e nV o l c k e ra n dt h eF O M Cc a m et ov i e wad i s i n ﬂation as both de-
sirable and inevitable. At the same time, this interval is overlaid with
a great deal of attention to the tactical issues of formulating monetary
policy in terms of monetary targets. Yet, when a fellow governor ex-
pressed concerns about the extent to which the monetary targeting pro-
cedure could be introducing volatility in interest rates, Wallich argued
“the main volatility that carries into long-term interest rates comes
from inﬂation and not from our procedures.” (FOMC transcripts,2 - 3 -
81, p. 54). Expectations had come to be an important constraint on
policy because as Governor Schultz argued “if we were to attempt to
ease, it’s pretty clear that everybody would think we had let the inﬂa-
tionary cat out of the bag. And it seems to me that interest rates would
be even higher under those circumstances.” (FOMC transcripts 3-31-
81, p. 29). In our view, this second great inﬂation scare was pivotal
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1981-82 was acceptable in light of the recurring recessions that would
be needed to deal with inﬂa t i o ns c a r e si nt h ef u t u r e .
3.3.2. Staying the course
The FOMC was determined to stay the course in the ﬁght against
inﬂation. Even as evidence accumulated that the economy was moving
into another recession, which the NBER dates from July 1981, Volcker
argued for continued tight policy,
[Our] job is in assessing where the risks lie... I haven’t
much doubt in my mind that it’s appropriate...to take the
risk of more softness in the economy in the short run than
one might ideally like in order to capitalize on the anti-
inﬂationary momentum...That is much more likely to give
a more satisfactory economic as well as inﬂationary outlook
over a period of time as compared to the opposite scenario
of heading oﬀ...sluggishness or even a downturn at the ex-
pense of rapidly getting back into the kind of situation we
were in last fall where we had some retreat on inﬂationary
psychology...Then we would look forward to another pro-
longed period of high interest rates and strain and face the
same dilemmas over and over again. (FOMC transcripts
7-6/7-81, p. 36)
In October 1981, Gerald Corrigan, president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, stressed that the crunch was coming with ﬁnan-
cial strains starting to hit.15. At the same meeting economist James
Kichline reported that the economy was in recession. But in November
1981, Volcker stressed the unchanged central problem of managing in-
ﬂation expectations, now compounded by a softening economy, “we’re
in a kind of no-win situation. If we deal with the inﬂation and long-term
interest rate problem, we cannot deal with the business problem; or if
we deal with the business problem aggressively, we can’t deal with the
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long-run inﬂation, long-term interest rate problem, I suspect. There
i sn ow a yw ec a nd oi tw i t ht h el i m i t e dt o o l st h a tw eh a v e . ”( F O M C
transcripts 11-17-81, p. 32).
Evidence presented at the December 1981 FOMC meeting suggested
that the recession was deepening. Nevertheless, Volcker and the FOMC
continued to seek lower inﬂation and a reduction in long-term interest
rates indicative of lower inﬂation expectations,
[The] only way we are really going to deal with this...is to
convince people that we have a hold on inﬂation and have
created a climate in which interest rates, particularly long-
term rates, will tend to go down. But how do we create that
climate and that expectation without in some sense risking
being overly tight in the short run? And because people
are so skeptical about whether that is going to happen, the
long-term rates won’t come down fast enough to facilitate
the recovery we want. (FOMC transcripts 12-21-81, p. 49)
By May 1982, the substantial economic weakness was accompanied
by evidence of lower inﬂation. Volcker noted that “nobody said it was
going to be easy to change these expectations and behavior patterns.
I don’t think we have changed them completely...It is going to take
some time...” (FOMC transcripts 5-18-82, p. 33). By the next FOMC
meeting, Gerald Corrigan noted that despite much bad news on the
macroeconomic front, it was important to recognize that progress on
inﬂation was being made. He pointed out that “[t]he inﬂation improve-
ment is no longer just a statistical aberration: it’s very real.” (FOMC
transcripts 6-30-82, p. 18)
3.4. Return to business as usual: October 1982
In October 1982, Chairman Volcker announced that the Fed would
place less emphasis on monetary targeting in its policy deliberations.
The announcement marked the formal end to operating procedures
adopted in October 1979 to target bank reserves more closely and allow
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usual” in two senses. First, it moved to manage the federal funds rate
more closely. Second, it moved to a policy stance designed to close
the output gap that it had created during the deliberate disinﬂation.
By October 1982 inﬂation had fallen to around 5%, the 10-year bond
rate had fallen by 2 percentage points since the summer, and the Fed
had brought the federal funds rate down from over 14% to around 9%
since July. Those developments convinced the FOMC that the cost, in
terms of short-term interest rate volatility, of monetary targeting and
the new operating procedures now outweighed the beneﬁts.
The Fed was also aware that the fall in interest rates associated with
the disinﬂation would give rise to a substantial increase in the quantity
of money demanded, and that the Fed would have to accommodate the
increased demand for money with a temporarily high rate of money
growth. Governor Gramley had stressed this eﬀect as early as the July
1981 FOMC meeting and it was again an object of discussion in October
1982.
The sharp reduction in interest rates and return to “business as
usual” ended the deep 1981-82 recession in November 1982. The Fed
held the federal funds rate in the 8 to 9% range through the ﬁrst half
of 1983 as inﬂation moved down to the 4% range because the long-term
interest rates failed to fall below 10%, indicating that the disinﬂation
still lacked full credibility. According to our model, an output gap of
some size was still needed to block the pass-through of expected inﬂa-
tion to current inﬂation. The stability of inﬂation, interest rates, and
bond rates during this period indicates that the acquisition of credibil-
ity was in a holding pattern.16 Nevertheless, the prospects for a robust
non-inﬂationary recovery from the deep recession looked good. In No-
vember 1982, the Almanac reported “the unprecedented sharp advance
on Wall Street” noting that “the Dow Jones average had risen almost
300 points since the series of sharp advances began in August when
interest rates began to fall.” The Dow passed 1000 in early November
1982.
16Credibility for the Volcker disinﬂation was secured more ﬁrmly only after the
F e dd e f e a t e dat h i r di n ﬂation scare in 1983-4 and the 10-year bond rate fell to 7
1/2% in 1986. The Volcker Fed’s credibility was challenged by a fourth inﬂation
scare in 1987, the year in which the leadership of the Fed passed to Alan Greenspan.
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4. Targets, instruments, and credibility
The Volcker disinﬂation is often described as involving a “regime
change” in U.S. monetary policy, since it reversed the rise of inﬂation.
The nature of the regime change, however, has been described in two
quite diﬀerent ways. It is sometimes portrayed as a great “monetarist
experiment” beginning in October 1979 in which the Fed gave priority
to controlling the monetary aggregates relative to other considerations,
and thus brought about a decline in inﬂation. Alternatively, the regime
change is sometimes portrayed as giving primacy to controlling inﬂation
with a new willingness to sustain elevated short-term interest rates to
bring inﬂation down. These alternative perspectives yield very diﬀerent
assessments of the “new operating procedures” adopted by the Fed in
October 1979 to target reserves and money more closely. Within the
former, reserve targeting was a central component of the new policy
regime designed to improve monetary control in order to bring inﬂation
down. Within the latter, reserve targeting simply allowed the Fed to
ascribe interest rate movements to market forces and thereby create
the leeway to raise interest rates as needed to break the inﬂation.
In this section, we use FOMC transcripts to shed light on the na-
ture of the “regime change”. We see that the FOMC initially adopted
reserve targeting and greater emphasis on monetary control in October
1979 to help acquire credibility for stabilizing inﬂation expectations.
Thereafter, the FOMC felt compelled to respect its monetary targets
so as not to jeopardize its credibility. However, doing so was not with-
out cost in greater short-term interest rate volatility, which at times
produced short rates that FOMC members thought counterproductive,
either for real activity or inﬂation.
4.1. Monetary targeting: context and framework
We begin by providing background: the history of monetary tar-
geting; the evolution of the federal funds rate prior to October 1979;
the new operating procedures announced on October 6, 1979 and an
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4.1.1. Monetary targets: 1970-1979
The Fed placed increasing emphasis on the monetary aggregates in
its policy deliberations in the 1970s. In January 1970, at its last meet-
ing under William McChesney Martin, the FOMC “stated its desire to
have increased emphasis placed on achieving speciﬁed growth rates of
certain monetary aggregates”, according to the review of 1970 mone-
tary policy by Jordan and Stevens [1971]. However, these economists at
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted that “the amount of em-
phasis placed on achieving growth targets of these aggregates, however,
varied considerably throughout the year.” In March 1975, a concurrent
resolution of Congress called for (i) the adoption and prompt public
disclosure of long-run monetary targets by the FOMC, and (ii) the ini-
tiation of regular consultations on monetary policy with congressional
committees. The ﬁrst monetary targets were announced soon after.
By 1978, under the leadership of G. William Miller, the FOMC em-
ployed short-run monetary targets to help guide policy between FOMC
meetings, together with annual monetary targets which it reported to
Congress in widely publicized testimony.
Thus, a monetary aggregate targeting framework was well estab-
lished by October 1979. In 1979, for example, the FOMC set one-year
money growth target ranges of 11
2 to 41
2 %f o rM 1a n d5t o8%f o r
M2. In addition, at each meeting, the FOMC set short-run growth
targets for M1 and M2. At the September 1979 meeting, for instance,
the FOMC set short-run ranges of 3 to 8% for M1 and 61
2 to 101
2%f o r
M2. (Lang [1980]). Yet, while the Fed placed increasing emphasis on
monetary targeting in the late 1970s, it had not contained inﬂation by
doing so. As Lindsey, Orphanides and Rasche [2005] stress, the growth
rate of either M1 or M2 had exceeded the upper bound of its announced
annual target range in 1976, 1977, and 1978.
4.1.2. The federal funds rate prior to October 1979
Prior to October 1979, the FOMC’s monetary policy directive spec-
iﬁed a narrow range for the federal funds rate, a range that was often
left unchanged for lengthy periods. For example, during the ﬁrst ﬁve
months of 1979 the funds rate traded in the target range of 93
4 to 101
2
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and highly publicized warnings of impending oil shortages, Volcker and
other members of the FOMC dissented repeatedly against the deci-
sion to leave the funds rate range unchanged, arguing that inﬂationary
pressures and expectations were rising.
Such “funds rate inertia” was criticized by many observers. Mone-
tarist economists had long argued that the sluggishness of the funds rate
led the money stock to be procyclical and thereby exerted a destabi-
lizing inﬂuence on real activity and inﬂation.17 Governor Wallich, who
would have bristled at being lumped in with monetarists, nevertheless
also suggested that FOMC management of the funds rate ﬁgured im-
portantly in the departures from targeted money growth in the late
1970s.18
H o w e v e r ,t h eu s eo fn a r r o wf u n d sr a t er a n g e sd i dn o ti m p e d ea
major upward movement in the funds rate at other times. In fact, the
funds rate increased from 6 1/3 % in April 1978 to 101
2 % in December
of that year, in a series of incremental steps. From this perspective,
the sluggishness of the funds rate in early 1979 seems attributable to
internal debate within the FOMC about macroeconomic conditions,
speciﬁcally whether prior rate increases were bringing on a recession,
rather than to any inherent inertia in the decision process itself.
4.1.3. The new operating procedures: October 6, 1979
In proposing the “new operating procedures” to the FOMC in a
telephone conference call on October 5, 1979, Volcker began by not-
ing that “the general issue, of course, is whether the present situation
requires some monetary policy action and if so, what kind...we really
want to consider a change in operating technique of the kind that we
have often discussed one way or another in the past...an approach that
17See, for instance, Poole [1978], pp. 105-10.
18Wallich [1983], pp. 147-8, argues “What changed in October 1979 was not the
target, but the techniques of implementing it. Up to that time, the Fed had sought
to implement its Ml and M2 targets and, at times, other targets by adjusting the
federal funds rate (i.e., the interbank rate) to inﬂuence the demand for money. This
was a workable technique, but it suﬀered from a reluctance of the FOMC to move
the funds rate fast enough and far enough to keep the money supply on track, even
over intervals of several months or longer. Because nobody, including the Fed, likes
to see interest rates go up, there was, overtime, a bias in policy which allowed the
money supply to expand excessively.”The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 30
involves leaning more heavily on the aggregates in the period imme-
diately ahead...And the complement of that is leaning less heavily on
the federal funds rate in terms of immediate policy objectives.” (p. 2)
Volcker asked the FOMC to consider “whether we want to adopt that
approach, not as a permanent [decision] at this stage, but as an ap-
proach for between now and the end of the year, roughly.” (p. 2) As
mentioned in section 3.2.2 above, the adoption of new operating proce-
dures for controlling money on October 6th was prompted by increasing
speculation in commodity and ﬁnancial markets, associated with rising
inﬂationary expectations. The new procedures involved a shift in the
method by which monetary policy was implemented: open market op-
erations were used to bring about a speciﬁed path for nonborrowed
reserves, with the intent of hitting a desired path for the money supply
and inﬂuencing the evolution of the economy.
The memo introducing the new operating procedures to the FOMC
by Axilrod and Sternlight [1979] considered both tactical and strategic
objectives. They began by noting that “The rate of inﬂation continues
unabated and inﬂation psychology seems more and more to be gen-
erating speculative pressures...” They pointed out that “The rate of
growth in the money supply has become the most widely publicized
indicator of the stance of monetary policy. Recently, money growth
has been quite rapid and, if continued, would result in failure by the
FOMC to achieve its monetary targets for 1979.” And they went on
to “propose a reserve targeting procedure that would, [they believed],
provide greater assurance than present operating techniques that the
FOMC will in fact achieve [its] money supply targets for the [year].”
Finally, they described potential strategic objectives as follows: “An-
nouncement of such a shift in procedure may itself have a beneﬁcial
calming eﬀect on inﬂationary psychology. However, the considerable
slowing in monetary growth rates from their current pace that the pub-
lic would expect from the announcement of such a shift in approach
would, of course, have to be rather soon achieved if any beneﬁts from
the announcement are not to be dissipated — if indeed an announcement
is not to be counterproductive.” (p. 1)
T h ed r a m a t i cr i s ei nt h ef e d e r a lf u n d sr a t et h a ti m m e d i a t e l yf o l -
lowed the adoption of the new operating procedures is consistent with
either way to view the October 1979 “regime change” sketched above.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 31
The funds rate rise can be seen as a consequence of strict reserve tar-
geting undertaken to improve monetary control; or it can be regarded
as a deliberately aggressive interest rate policy action that the Fed
conveniently ascribed to market forces.
4.1.4. Monetary targets after October 1979
The FOMC policy directive was revised in a number of ways upon
the adoption of the new operating procedures. The revised directive
gave primacy to maintaining various measures of the money supply
(M1, M2 and M3) within their “long-run” ranges, i.e., the annual tar-
gets for 1979. However, the FOMC also raised the 1979 target for M1
to 3 to 6% from the previously speciﬁed 11
2 to 41
2 % range. The revised
directive also speciﬁed a wider 111
2 to 151
2% range for the federal funds
rate. Figure 6 shows the dramatically wider federal funds rate ranges
beginning in October 1979.
The wider target range for M1 allowed the Fed to hit its M1 target
for 1979; M2 slightly exceeded the 8% upper bound of its unchanged
range at year’s end. The slowing of money growth in the last quarter of
1979 was associated with the dramatic rise in the funds rate discussed
above and shown in Figure 6.
In 1979 and 1980, the introduction of two new transactions ac-
counts, ATS (automatic transfer services between savings and checking
accounts) and NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) accounts, com-
plicated monetary targeting. The diﬃculties posed by ATS and NOW
accounts were partly behind the increase in the M1 target in October
1979 and prompted the development of an alternative measure of M1
during 1980, so-called M1B with the prior measure renamed M1A. .
Policy directives in 1980 provided increasingly detailed informa-
tion on the money stock targets. For example, the directive from the
April 1980 FOMC meeting speciﬁed that reserve aggregate manage-
ment should be undertaken consistent with three diﬀerent short-run
monetary targets: 41
2% for M1A, 5% for M1B, and 63
4%f o rM 2 .T h e s e
“short run” targets were designed to be consistent with annual 1980
target growth rates of 31
2 to 6% for M1A, 4 to 61
2%f o rM 1 B ,a n d6
to 9% for M2 that had been set at the February 1980 FOMC meeting.
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FOMC’s short-run monetary targets varied substantially through time
in 1980. Over the year, the ﬁgure shows that M1B ended up within
the 1980 target range; not shown, M1A grew at less than 31
2%a n dM 2
grew at more than 9% in 1980.
4.2. Was monetary targeting a vise or a veil?
Our reading of evidence from FOMC transcripts below indicates
that monetary targets were neither a vise nor a veil during the Volcker
disinﬂation. Monetary targets were not a vise in the sense that they
did not prevent the FOMC from managing short-term interest rates to
some degree. Neither were they a veil that provided an excuse for high
interest rates without exerting any constraint on interest rate policy.
The FOMC recognized that it had to show respect for its monetary
targets in order to enjoy their credibility-building beneﬁts, so that on
occasion it had to allow short-term interest rates to move in ways it
deemed detrimental for real activity or inﬂation.
4.2.1. The reserve instrument
From the many pages of FOMC transcripts devoted to issues of
r e s e r v et a r g e t i n g ,i ti sc l e a rt h a tt h eF O M Ct o o kt h en e wo p e r a t i n g
procedures and the task of setting and adhering to the inter-meeting
path for reserves very seriously. There was a real change in operating
method.
4.2.2. Funds rate ranges and decision inertia
Y e t ,w h i l ei tg a v ep r i o r i t yt or e s e r v ea n dm o n e yt a r g e t i n gi ni t sd i -
rective, on occasion the FOMC used two techniques to maintain tight
control of the federal funds rate at the expense of its monetary targets.
First, the FOMC at times adopted a tolerance range for the federal
funds rate that was considerably narrower than the wide ranges re-
ported in its policy directives. Second, the FOMC at times adopted
reserve paths that were aimed at maintaining a relatively stable funds
rate even in the face of rising monetary growth.
For instance, at the April 1980 FOMC meeting, with money and real
activity falling, the FOMC agreed on a funds rate range of 13 to 19%The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 33
along with the monetary targets discussed above. But it also agreed on
a narrow “15 to 16% notional range” for the funds rate, with movements
outside of this range to trigger a telephone consultation by the FOMC.19
Within a week of the April FOMC meeting, the declining demand for
reserves and money due to the developing recession of 1980 pushed the
funds rate against the lower part of the notional range and triggered a
t e l e p h o n ec o n f e r e n c ec a l la tw h i c ht h eF O M Cd e b a t e dm a i n t a i n i n gt h e
funds rate but ultimately decided to let it fall somewhat.
The situation was reversed at the October 1980 FOMC meeting
when a rapidly expanding demand for money and reserves associated
with the recovery from the 1980 recession put upward pressure on the
funds rate. The funds rate range speciﬁed in the prior directive had
b e e nv e r yw i d e ,8 - 1 4 % ,a n dt h ef u n d sr a t ew a ss t i l li nt h em i d d l eo f
t h a tr a n g ea ta b o u t1 2 1
2% when the FOMC met in October. After a
vigorous debate, however, the committee adopted a proposal by Volcker
for a reserve path that was estimated to maintain the funds rate at the
121
2% level or slightly higher in spite of booming money growth. (see
Figures 6 and 7).
We thus see vestiges of interest rate smoothing and decision inertia
in these two meetings. In one situation (April 1980), the FOMC con-
sidered maintaining a high funds rate as money growth fell, so as to
continue to ﬁght inﬂation. In the other (October 1980), it maintained
the funds rate while the monetary aggregates grew rapidly because
some FOMC members viewed the rate as suﬃciently restrictive. In
both cases, economic circumstances that seemed so critical in these
FOMC meetings were soon swept away by larger events.
On the other hand, even the wide federal funds rate tolerance ranges
stated in the FOMC directive were not always maintained. For in-
stance, in May 1981 a booming economy, accelerating money growth,
and rising interest rates associated with the second inﬂation scare pushed
the funds rate above the 13-18% tolerance range that had been set at the
April FOMC meeting and triggered a telephone conference call on May
6. However, in light of the extraordinary circumstances, the FOMC
opted simply to treat the 18% upper bound as a “checkpoint” rather
than a constraint. At Volcker’s urging, the FOMC released a statement
after the conference call stressing that the reserve and money supply
19See FOMC transcripts, conference call on 4-29-80, p. 1.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 34
targets from the April FOMC meeting were unchanged.
These episodes highlight that the FOMC managed the reserve ag-
gregate and the federal funds rate with some discretion in light of real
economic activity and inﬂation. Monetary targeting was far from a
mechanical rule.
4.2.3. Prisoner of the monetary targets?
At the April 1980 FOMC conference call mentioned above, no progress
had yet been made on inﬂation. Volcker, Anthony Solomon (president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Governor Wallich all
expressed concern about allowing the federal funds rate to fall. Wallich
was most forceful, arguing: “we’ve become prisoners here of our tech-
nique. I don’t think from an overall point of view that we want such
a sudden degree of easing...It is not going to help us to say that we
haven’t changed policy and we’re following the same targets as before.
People would perceive the big change in interest rates. And I think
substantively they would be right; it is a change in policy if we let in-
terest rates drop dramatically.” (p. 4) Robert Forrestal of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta agreed: “Basically we’re on target with what
we intended to do last October. I think the greater risk at this point,
both domestically and internationally, would be to run the risk of un-
derkill on inﬂation. Without any reduction of the inﬂation rate we’d
be making a serious mistake if we didn’t [show] some resistance at this
point to a precipitous decline in interest rates.” (p. 6)
On the other hand, Governor Partee and Frank Morris, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, argued vigorously that the rapidly
dropping monetary aggregates indicated in Morris’s words “a dramatic
and very widespread weakening in the economy” that called for lower
interest rates to stimulate the economy. Morris also expressed concern
about the FOMC “moving back to the management of interest rates,”
adding that “[this operating technique] has turned the situation around
a lot faster than would have occurred if we had been managing interest
rates on the up side. For us to turn around and try to manage them
on the down side...would be a mistake.” (p. 6)
Finally, the monetarist wing of the FOMC represented by Robert
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Roos, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, argued force-
fully that the FOMC should provide countercyclical stimulus by hitting
its monetary targets.
The April 1980 debate nicely illustrates the tensions in the FOMC
involving the use of monetary targets. In April 1980 and subsequent
months, an unusual coalition of FOMC members — some concerned with
monetary targets and others with preventing declines in real activity
— carried the day against the reservations of Volcker and others who
sought to keep the funds rate high to combat inﬂation. But, tensions
over monetary targets also surfaced at other meetings. As we saw
earlier, with money growth running above the target in October 1980,
the FOMC decided to resist upward pressure on the funds rate.
4.2.4. Credibility and monetary targets
The FOMC transcripts also show that a wide range of committee
members were concerned with the credibility eﬀects of missing mone-
tary targets. For instance, at the October 1980 FOMC meeting men-
tioned above, three members of the FOMC dissented against the deci-
sion to target a rapid growth of reserves to stabilize the funds rate at
121
2%. Of the three—Morris, Roos, and Wallich—the ﬁrst two expressed
concerns about the adverse eﬀects on credibility. Morris, in particu-
lar, engaged in a lengthy discussion with Volcker about the importance
of hitting the monetary targets, warning that the ﬁnancial community
was “watching us like hawks” and that “we...need....to get expecta-
tions working for us rather than against us.” (p. 28) More predictably,
Roos took a hard line on the links between performance vis-a-vis mon-
etary targets, arguing “inﬂationary expectations [might be rekindled]
because of the loss of credibility in our October program and we’d have
high interest rates and inﬂation...I think it’s a very critical time for our
credibility.” (p. 35)
4.2.5. Monetary targeting with evolving aggregates
O n ep a r t i c u l a rc h a l l e n g ef o rt h eF O M Cw a st h a tt h ec o m m i t t e e
members increasingly came to distrust M1. At the July 1981 meeting
in which the FOMC was to choose money target ranges for 1982, Morris
argued that “we ought to face up to the fact that we do not knowThe Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 36
how to measure transactions balances in our present society. M1B is
somewhat of a nostalgic attempt to maintain a concept of transactions
balances and I think it’s leading us into all kinds of problems.” (p. 24)
G o v e r n o rS c h u l t zc o n t i n u e d :“ i ts e e m st om et h a tt h i si so n l yh a l fo ft h e
problem...we don’t know what the monetary aggregates are...[and]...we
don’t know what the relationship is between the aggregates and GNP.”
(p. 25) But Volcker responded: ”We unfortunately have to use these
fragile numbers...we happen to have a law as well as an expectation
that says that we have to review our present targets and have to put
down some new ones for next year.” (p. 33)
4.2.6. Strategy, tactics, and outcomes
The increased emphasis on monetary targets in October 1979 was
initially designed to signal the Fed’s unwillingness to tolerate a ris-
ing rate of inﬂation, in part by widening the tolerance ranges for the
federal funds rate. We noted above, however, that at important junc-
tures, such as the April 1980 and October 1980 meetings, the FOMC
made decisions on reserve management that took into account poten-
tial eﬀects of these actions on both the path of the funds rate and on
economic activity. That is, in each of these meetings the FOMC had in
mind smaller ranges for federal funds than those publicly discussed. At
other junctures, such as in April and May 1981, when faced with rising
monetary growth and increasing long-term interest rates, the FOMC
sought to send a strong signal that the funds rate was not being implic-
itly targeted and, to do so, emphasized its support for a stable reserve
path.
During the disinﬂation, then, our sense is that the Volcker-led FOMC
undertook a delicate balancing act. It sought to manage short-term in-
terest rates and to respect monetary targets. It also sought to reduce
inﬂation while avoiding undue losses in real economic activity. It did
so while experimenting with a new operating procedure, facing signiﬁ-
cant evolution of the banking sector, signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in expected
inﬂation, and the imposition of credit controls.
The complexity of the monetary policy behavior evident in the tran-
scripts led us to adopt the strategy that we used in the paper. We
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utilizing a policy rule. Instead, we focused on the interplay between
inﬂation, output, interest rates, and credibility. Ultimately, one would
like to add the “missing policy equation” to better understand the in-
credible Volcker disinﬂation.
4.3. The behavior of money growth
Figure 8 displays annual growth rates of M1B and M2 from 1976
through 1985. The dashed line in the ﬁgure shows the behavior of the
inﬂation rate during the period; the two vertical lines mark the October
1979 and October 1982 regime changes discussed above. There are
several striking features of this ﬁgure. First, there is little evidence of a
low-frequency relationship between money growth and inﬂation during
the 1978-1980 rise in inﬂation or in the 1981-83 decline in inﬂation.
Second, the monetary time series are not evidently smoother during
the period of increased emphasis on monetary targeting.
This behavior is, we think, important for understanding the evolu-
tion of the credibility of the Volcker disinﬂation. Monetary aggregates
did not, at the time or in retrospect, signal to individuals that there
was a sharp break in actual Fed behavior. By contrast, interest rate
behavior was clearly diﬀerent, but subtle to interpret. The public was
left to decide whether a high general level of nominal interest rates and
high short-term nominal interest rates, in particular, reﬂected an ac-
commodation of high inﬂation or a policy to contain inﬂation and bring
it down.
5. Conclusions
In the late 1970s, there was considerable doubt about the ability of
interest rate policy to deliver low and stable inﬂation. On the acad-
emic side, the provocative work of Sargent and Wallace [1975] argued
that the price level was indeterminate within a rational expectations
macro model if the central bank employed a short-term interest rate as
its policy instrument. On the practical side, inﬂation and inﬂation ex-
pectations were rising rapidly, perhaps because central banks actually
used interest rates as policy instruments. Hence, both academics and
central bankers looked to the alternative of monetary targeting usingThe Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 38
reserve instruments.
One of Ben McCallum’s classic papers provided a middle ground
by showing that the short-term nominal interest rate could be used
as a policy instrument if it is part of a monetary targeting rule which
provides a nominal anchor so that the path of the price level is de-
terminate (McCallum [1981]). Working within a rational expectations
model, McCallum showed that a credible central bank using an interest
rate instrument could potentially bring about low and stable inﬂation.
Together with work of Michael Parkin [1978] on this topic, McCal-
lum’s paper opened the door to modern analysis of interest rate rules
n o ws t a n d a r di na c a d e m i aa n dc e n t ral banking. The essential link-
age is that private agents could form expectations about future central
bank behavior and that such future behavior could be consistent with a
unique process for inﬂation. Crucially, McCallum’s analysis presumed
that the central bank followed a policy rule which was fully credible,i n
the sense that private inﬂation expectations were consistent with the
central bank’s intentions for inﬂation.
In contrast, during the Volcker disinﬂa t i o nt h eF e dn e e d e dt oac-
quire credibility for low and stable inﬂation. We studied this episode
without having a ﬁrm understanding of Fed behavior, so instead we
adopted an analytical strategy that focused on the interplay between
inﬂation, expected inﬂation, credibility and real activity without speci-
fying the monetary policy rule. We sought to document how the Volcker
FOMC tried to acquire credibility: with an initial appeal to monetary
targets as a nominal anchor, with new operating procedures designed
to allow greater scope for short-term interest rates to be determined
by market forces, and ultimately by employing an interest rate and re-
serve aggregate policy mix to work the actual inﬂation rate down. Our
methodology for studying the disinﬂation without a ﬁrm understanding
of the Fed’s behavioral rule places us in a position similar to the public
and the FOMC itself. To improve our understanding of the Volcker
disinﬂation, it will be necessary to specify Fed behavior explicitly and
to model the interaction of Fed policy with the dynamics of private
sector beliefs about inﬂation. Requiring these beliefs to be consistent
with the ﬁnancial market data will allow a clearer understanding of the
role of imperfect credibility in the Volcker disinﬂation.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 39
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Figure 1: Inﬂation rates (annual percentage change of PCE and Core
PCE indices). NBER recessions indicated with shaded areas; Romer
and Romer [1989] "inﬂation-ﬁghting" dates indicated with ♦; Good-
friend [1993] "inﬂation scare" intervals marked with vertical boxes; Vol-
cker term as Fed chairman indicated with dark line on the horizontal
axis.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 43






























Figure 2: Inﬂation, traditional output gap, and components of output
during the Volcker disinﬂation. Inﬂation (annual percent change in
PCE); traditional output gap is deviation of output from linear trend
line under assumption that economy is at capacity in 1979:QIII and
in 1984:QIV; components of output are services (PCESVC96), total
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Figure 3: Interest rates on 1-year and 10-year bonds (percent per
annum). NBER recessions indicated with shaded areas; Romer and
Romer [1989] "inﬂation-ﬁghting" dates indicated with ♦; Goodfriend
[1993] "inﬂation scare" intervals marked with vertical boxes; Volcker
term as Fed chairman indicated with dark line on the horizontal axis.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 45
































Figure 4: Deliberate disinﬂation with imperfect credibility in a simple
model. Inﬂation falls by 6 percentage points over 10 quarters starting
at quarter 1; probability of success rises from zero over 12 quarters
starting at quarter 4.The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 46












































































Next 10 years (average)
Figure 5: Deliberate disinﬂation with imperfect credibility in a simple
model. Output, expected output growth, and expected inﬂation at
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Figure 6: Eﬀective federal funds rate and FOMC ranges. Dashed line
in bottom panel is the 10-year bond rate. All series are percent per
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Figure 7: M1B money stock (in billions of dollars) with long-run and
short-run target ranges for 1980. Actual money stock (solid line) is
weekly data. Source: Gilbert and Trebbing [1980].The Incredible Volcker Disinﬂation 49














Figure 8: M1B and M2 money growth, 1976-1985 (annual percent
change, quarterly data). Dashed line in both panels is PCE inﬂation
rate